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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; bail hearings-domestic offenses
Penal Code § 1270.1 (amended).
ABX 59 (Alpert); 1994 STAT. Ch. 58X
Existing law requires each county to adopt a uniform bail schedule to be used
throughout the county.' Existing law also provides that when a person who has
been arrested for a violent felony2 is released on ball for an amount that is either
more or less than that set in the bail schedule for the offense charged, there must
be a hearing before the magistrate or judge.3 If the judge or magistrate sets the
bail at an amount that is more or less than that specified in the bail schedule, the
judge or magistrate is required to state the reasons for the deviation and may be
required to address the issue of threats made against the victim(s).4
Chapter 58X adds to existing law by imposing the same hearing requirements
whenever a person who has been arrested for the rape of a spouse,s corporal
injury to a spouse or cohabitant,6 stalking,7 or battery of a noncohabiting former
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b (West Supp. 1994); see Review of Selected 1973 Legislation, Criminal
Procedure; Adoption of Bail Schedules, 5 PAc. LJ. 205,334 (1974) (discussing bail schedules in California);
see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (setting forth the rights of a defendant to be released on bail); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1275 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth considerations for fixing bail amounts); People v. Arnold, 58
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 5, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925-26 (1976) (applying California Penal Code § 1275 and
discussing the considerations for fixing bail amounts). See generally 4 B.E. WVioN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Proceedings Before Trial, § 2604(e) (2d ed. 1989) (discussing bail schedules).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining violent felonies); see also People
v. Hetherington, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1140,201 Cal. Rptr. 756,760 (1984) (holding that child molestation
and abuse qualifies as a violent felony due to the extreme psychological and emotional harm to the victim);
accord People v. Stephenson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 7, 10,206 Cal. Rptr. 444,446 (1984).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (amended by Chapter 58X); see id. § 825 (West Supp. 1994) (setting
forth procedures for a hearing before the magistrate and prohibiting unnecessary delay of the hearing); see also
CAL CONsr. art. I, § 14 (requiring that a defendant be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay);
id. § 15 (providing a defendant with the right to a speedy trial). But see Barry D. Parkinson, Comment,
Preventative Detention in California: Can Some Criminal Defendants be Detained Prior to Trial?, 3 PAC. LJ.
142, 148-65 (1972) (discussing preventive detention without bail and its constitutional implications).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (amended by Chapter 58X).
5. See il § 262 (West Supp. 1994) (defining rape of a spouse); see also id. § 261 (West Supp. 1994)
(defining rape); id § 264 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the punishment for rape and rape of a spouse). See
generally Carin C. Azarcon & Jennifer L. Miller, Review of Selected 1993 Legislation, Crimes; Sex
Offenses-Spousal Rape, Sex Offender Registration, 25 PAC. LJ. 368, 590 (1994) (discussing spousal rape).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1994) (defining corporal injury to a spouse or
cohabitant); see also People v. Wilkins, 14 Cal. App. 4th 761,771, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 748 (1993) (stating
that a person has committed corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant by merely inflicting minor injury as
opposed to serious or great bodily injury), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 3903 (1993); People v. Holifield,
205 Cal. App. 3d 993, 1000, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729,733-34 (1988) (defining cohabiting to mean an unrelated man
and woman living together in a substantial relationship manifested by permanence and sexual or amorous
intimacy).
7. See CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994) (defining the crime of stalking); cf CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1708.7(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (defining the tort of stalking). See generally Jennifer L. Miller, Review
of Selected 1993 Legislation, Crimes; Stalking, 25 PAc.LJ. 368,595 (1994) (discussing the crime of stalking).
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spouse, fiance(e), or a person who currently has or previously had a dating rela-
tionship8 with the defendant, is released on a bail amount that is more or less than
that set in the bail schedule.9
Additionally, Chapter 58X imposes the same hearing requirements when a per-
son who has been arrested for one of the specified offenses is to be released on
his or her own recognizance.10
INTERPRMTVE COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 58X is to protect the public from improper release of
defendants by preventing defense attorneys from "judge shopping" in an attempt
to have their clients released without any or with reduced bail." Chapter 58X
allows the prosecutor to argue that a defendant's bail should not deviate from the
bail schedule.' However, there is some question as to whether holding a hearing
for deviation from the bail schedule has had any effect in protecting the public. 13
Jonathan R Hobbs
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the punishment for battery of
a former spouse, fiance(e), or person with current or previous dating relationship); id. § 243(f)(11) (West Supp.
1994) (defining dating relationship as a frequent, intimate association primarily characterized by the
expectation of affectional or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations); County of Santa
Clara v. Willis, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1240, 1251 n.6, 225 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 n.6 (1986) (stating that the slightest
touching may constitute a criminal battery even if it does not cause bodily harm or pain or leave a mark on the
victim); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1988) (defining battery).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (amended by Chapter 58X).
10. Id. § 1270.1 (amended by Chapter 58X); see id. § 1270 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the
conditions when a person may be released on his or her own recognizance); see also Kawaichi v. Madigan,
53 Cal. App. 3d 461, 465, 126 Cal. Rptr. 63, 66 (1975) (holding that arrestees must bear the burden of showing
that they should be released on their own recognizance).
I1. SEE ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CoMMmTFrE ANALYSIS OF ABX 59, at I (May 3,
1994) (stating that attorneys have been known to judge shop when their clients are accused of stalking or
domestic violence); see also Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282,285-86 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that the
court has the power to revoke bail in order to further the administration ofjustice); Kelly Rowe, Comment, The
Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY
L.J. 855, 907 (1985) (advocating higher bails for domestic violence cases); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal
Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem4 Forging the Solutions, 60 WsH. L. REv.
267, 320-21 (1985) (recommending stricter bail requirements for persons arrested for spouse beating). But see
Bob Levenson, Court Thinks Spouse Abuse Rules Unfair, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRm., Aug. 7, 1992, at BI
(quoting a judge's disapproval of the holding of a defendant without bail for 24 days on domestic violence
charges that were eventually dropped).
12. ASSEMBLY COMMrriEE ON PUBLIC SAFEIY, COM/rrTEE ANALYSlS OFABX 59, at I (May 3,1994).
13. Id. at 2; see id. (questioning whether there is any data tending to indicate that holding bail hearings
has helped protect the public).
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Criminal Procedure; insanity plea-inadmissible mental conditions
Penal Code § 25.5 (new).
SBX 40 (Bergeson); STAT. Ch. lOX
Existing law provides that the defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
will be found by the trier of fact only when the accused proves by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding
his or her act, nor capable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time when the
act was committed.! Chapter lOX bars any finding in support of a defense by
reason of insanity that is based solely on a personality or adjustment disorder,2 a
seizure, or an addiction to, or abuse of, intoxicating substances. 3 Chapter 1OX is
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1988); see CAL. EVI. CODE § 522 (West 1966) (providing that
any party claiming insanity has the burden of proof on that issue); see also People v. Hom, 158 Cal. App. 3d
1014, 1032,205 Cal. Rptr. 119, 127 (1984) (holding that California Penal Code § 25 reinstates the M'Naghten
right and wrong test for the insanity defense in California, and interpreting insanity under that section to be
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that either the person was unable to understand the nature and
quality of his or her act or unable to distinguish right from wrong); M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719
(1843) (holding that in order to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, the person must show that at the
time of committing the act, he was unable, by reason of defect or disease of the mind, to know that his act was
wrong); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (Supp. 1994) (providing that a person may be found "guilty
except insane" if at the time of the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental
disease or defect of such severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong); id. § 13-502(D)
(Supp. 1994) (providing that if a defendant is found to be "guilty except insane," the court must determine the
sentence that the defendant could have received had he not been insane, and the judge must commit the
defendant pursuant.to specifications for that term); IlL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/6-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(providing that a person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of
mental disease or mental defect, he or she lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the
conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of the law). See generally In re Slayback, 209 Cal. 480,
490, 288 P. 769, 773 (1930) (stating that punishment cannot be legally inflicted upon a person for an act
committed while insane); I B.E. Wrnc & NORMAN L. EpsnaN, CALORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses §§ 204-
212 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the effects and interpretations of Proposition 8, the California
M'Naghten test, and voluntary intoxication as no defense).
2. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DIsORDERs 335 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (describing personality disorder as constituting inflexible and maladaptive
personality traits that cause either significant functional impairment or subjective distress); id. at 335-58
(setting forth provisions regarding diagnosis and categorization of personality disorders); id. at 329 (defining
adjustment disorder as a maladaptive reaction to an identifiable psychosocial stressor that occurs within three
months after the onset of the stressor, and has persisted for no longer than six months); id. at 329-31 (setting
forth diagnostic criteria for adjustment disorder and the various types of adjustment disorder); SENATE FLOOR,
CommiTrEE ANALYSIS OF SBX 40, at 2 (May 12, 1994) (stating that according to the Department of Mental
Health, personality disorders do not render the person suffering from them out of touch with reality, but that
persons with these disorders have difficulty adjusting to societal constructs and are persons who are easily
angered and suffer from irresponsible behavior patterns); id. (stating that people with personality disorders are
not particularly amenable to therapeutic support); id. (stating that adjustment disorders are temporary, short
lived, uncharacteristic dysfunctional reactions that may occur in response to a normal life situation, and that
persons suffering from adjustment disorders are not out of touch with reality).
3. Id. § 25.5 (enacted by Chapter 1OX); see People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 369, 673 P.2d 680,706,
197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 829 (1983) (holding that the insanity defense requirement that the defendant be suffering
from a mental disease or defect prevents consideration of a mental illness if that illness is manifested only by
a series of criminal or antisocial acts), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 897 (1984); id. at 372, 673 P.2d at 708, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 831 (stating that to classify persons suffering from antisocial personality disorders as insane would put
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applicable to persons who use the insanity defense on or after the date its
provisions become effective.4
INTERPRETVE COMMENT
By enacting Chapter 10X, the Legislature defines the mental conditions that are
not admissible when a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered.5 The
exclusion of personality or adjustment disorders, seizures, or addiction to or abuse
of intoxicating substances is designed to prevent abuse of the insanity plea and
to appropriately direct individuals to the correctional system rather than the state
hospitals.6 Experts agree that individuals suffering from personality or adjustment
disorders do not have a major mental disorder, and these individuals usually have
the capacity to distinguish right from wrong.7 The sponsor of Chapter 10X states
that individuals with personality disorders may attempt to use the insanity defense
to avoid prison terms, and if successful in this defense, these individuals will be
committed to a state hospital, where they are eligible to apply for a conditional
release from the hospital after 180 days.8 The sponsor of Chapter 1OX also asserts
in the mental institutions persons for whom there is currently no treatment and who would present a constant
danger to staff and other inmates); iU! (stating that prisons, not mental hospitals, are for persons with antisocial
personality disorders); People v. Griggs, 17 Cal. 2d 621, 625, 110 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1941) (stating that
although drunkenness is no excuse for crime, when insanity is the result of long continued intoxication, it
affects responsibility in the same way as insanity produced by any other cause); cf ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
13-502(A) (Supp. 1994) (stating that mental defect or disease that constitutes legal insanity does not include
disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or drugs, character defects,
psychosexual disorders, or impulse control disorders, and that conditions that do not constitute legal insanity
include, but are not limited to, temporary conditions arising from the pressure of the circumstances, moral
decadence, depravity or passion growing out of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred or other motives in a person
not suffering from a mental defect or disease or an abnormality that is manifested only by criminal conduct);
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/6-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (stating that the terms mental disease or mental
defect, for purposes of an insanity defense, do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
or otherwise antisocial conduct).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5 (enacted by Chapter 10X).
5. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrmEANALYSIS OFSBX40, at2 (May 12, 1994).
6. Id. at 2-3.
7. l. at 3; see Miles Corwin, Recent Crimes Shock Old-Tmers Doing Tune: California Joint Insiders
See Trend of More Ruthless, Random Violence and Less Remorse, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1993, at A19
(reporting that people with what psychiatrists call "antisocial personality disorder" are more prevalent today,
and that such persons basically have no feelings and absolutely no remorse or concern for other people's
suffering). But see Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. DAVIS
L REV. 383,385 (1992) (arguing that persons suffering from multiple personality disorder are not blameworthy
and should not be punished).
8. SENATE FLOOR, CommrrrEE ANALYStS oFSBX 40, at 3 (MAY 12,1994); see CAL. PENAL CODE §
1601(a) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring persons found not guilty by reason of insanity of murder, mayhem, and
other specified violent felonies to spend not less than 180 days confined in a state hospital before outpatient
status will be available to them); id. § 1026.2 (West Supp. 1994) (providing the procedure and application
requirements for persons committed to a state mental hospital to apply for release from the state hospital on
the grounds of restoration of sanity); id. § 1026.2(d) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that no hearing upon
application for release from a state mental hospital will be allowed until the person committed has been
confined or placed on outpatient status for not less than 180 days).
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that with the enactment of California's "three strikes" law,9 many more
individuals will attempt to use the insanity defense in order avoid life impri-
sonment, therefore necessitating a clearer definition of the conditions that do not
qualify under the defense.'0
Darren K. Cottriel
Criminal Procedure; suspension of driver's license- controlled substance
conviction
Vehicle Code §§ 13202.3, 14907 (repealed and new).
ABX 79 (Frazee); 1994 STAT. Ch. 38X
Existing law allows a court to suspend or order the Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV)' to revoke the driver's license of an individual convicted of a
specified controlled substance offense2 if the use of a vehicle was involved in, or
incidental to, the commission of the offense. Existing law provides that such a
suspension or revocation may not exceed three years.' Existing law requires the
court to suspend the driver's license of, or delay the issuance of a driver's license
to, any individual between the ages of thirteen and twenty-one who has been
convicted of certain controlled substance offenses.5 Under Chapter 38X, a person
9. See Increased Sentences, Repeat Offenders Initiative Statute, Proposition 184, Nov. 8, 1994
California General Election (adding Penal Code § 1170.12).
10. SENATEFLOOR, COMMnmEEANALYSts OFSBX40, at 3 (May 12, 1994).
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1650-1678 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (describing the powers and duties
of the Department of Motor Vehicles).
2. See CAL HEALTH & SAFm' CODE §§ 11000-11648 (West 1991& Supp. 1994) (encompassing the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, providing general definitions, standards, and schedules, and describing
offenses, penalties, and other matters relating to controlled substances).
3. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202(a) (West 1987).
4. Id. § 13202(c) (West 1987); see id (allowing courts discretion in determining a period of revocation
while establishing a maximum length); see also People v. Monday, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1489, 1492-93, 274 Cal.
Rptr. 617, 619 (1990) (holding that a defendant's loss of his driver's license was supported by evidence that
he was traveling in an automobile and was carrying methamphetamine, even though his travel was only
incidental to the offense).
5. CAL VEH. CODE. § 13202.5 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (requiring an automatic one-year license
suspension for a violation of any of the following: California Health and Safety Code §j§ 11000-11748
(controlled substance offenses); California Penal Code § 191.5 (gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated); California Penal Code § 192(c)(3) (vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated); or California Penal
Code § 647(f) (disorderly conduct while intoxicated)); see also People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp.
6, 10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (1991) (finding that the law requiring license suspension for possession of
alcohol by a minor is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in promoting highway safely). See
generally George J. Kunzelman, Review of Selected 1990 California Legislation, Transportation and Motor
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convicted of a specified controlled substance offense would lose his or her
license for six months.7 Each subsequent conviction for a specified offense would
require an additional six-month suspension! However, Chapter 38X allows
individuals convicted of specified drug offenses to retain their license if they can
demonstrate compelling circumstances.9
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 38X was enacted in order to comply with a federal law ° that requires
states to either impose a six-month driver's license suspension on a convicted
drug offender" or to deliver a resolution from the state legislature, signed by the
Governor, to the United States Secretary of Transportation, indicating that the
state does not wish to implement the license suspension policy.2 The penalty for
Vehicles; Drivers' License Suspension-Vandalism, 22 PAC. LJ. 323, 734 (1991) (describing license
suspension for alcohol, controlled substances, and vandalism offenses by juveniles).
6. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3(c) (enacted by Chapter 38X) (specifying that a conviction means
a conviction of any controlled substance offense contained in the laws of the United States, each state, territory,
or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; a forfeiture
of bail, bond, or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any
controlled substance offense; a violation of California Health and Safety Code §§ 11000-11648 involving
possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation, or transfer of those substances which are prohibited under
those sections; or an offense involving a controlled substance as defined in California Vehicle Code §§ 23152-
23229.1). But see SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMrTEE, CoMMITrEE ANALYSIS of ABX 79, at 2 (June 28,1994)
(stating that according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, a person will not be deemed
to be convicted if he or she is diverted to a drug diversion program).
7. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 38X); see id. (providing that the penalty of
driver's license suspension is in addition to any other penalty for the controlled substance offense and stating
that this penalty need not be applied if the defendant's license is already suspended pursuant to California
Vehicle Code §§ 13202 or 13202.5).
8. Id. § 13202.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 38X).
9. Id. § 13202.3(b) (enacted by Chapter 38X).
10. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 159(a) (West Supp. 1994) (describing the procedures for the withholding of
highway apportionments for non-compliance with the provisions of 23 U.S.C.A. § 159); see also Quiller v.
Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641,642 (Ga. 1993) (upholding a suspension of a driver's license for a conviction of a
drug offense), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 72 (1993).
11. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 159(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1994) (noting that in addition to a six-month
suspension of licenses already issued, individuals who do not have licenses must receive a six-month delay in
the issuance of their license from their application date); see also SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMiT'EE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF ABX 79, at 4 (June 28, 1994) (indicating that as of June 28, 1994, 14 states plus the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico have enacted laws suspending driver's licenses of convicted drug offenders for at
least six months); see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-290, 13A-12-291 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-
915 (Michie Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-75 (1991); IND. CODEANN. § 35484-15 (West Supp. 1994);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-1-71 (Supp. 1993) (all imposing a minimum six-month driver's license suspension for
a controlled substance conviction); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-745 (Law Co-op. 1990) (imposing a driver's
license suspension of six months for marijuana and hashish offenses and a suspension of one year for other
controlled substance violations).
12. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMnTEE ANALYSIS OF ABX 79, at 2 (Apr. 11,
1994); see 23 U.S.C.A. 159(aX3XB) (West Supp. 1994) (describing procedures for opting-out of the program
and providing that a resolution in opposition to enactment or enforcement of the law must be signed by the
Governor and approved by both houses of the state's legislature where applicable); see also SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMTrFEE, CwMrEI3 ANALYSIS OF ABX 79, at 4 (June 28, 1994) (noting that as of June 28, 1994, 28 states
had complied with the federal legislation by stating that they were opposed to it).
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failing to follow either of these options is the loss of specified federal highway
funds.'
3
The federal legislation stems from the "War on Drugs."' 4 It is believed that the
threat of the loss of a driver's license will be an effective deterrent to casual drug
users and the young, and that the safety of the nation's highways will be
improved.' 5 The federal legislation was also designed to influence states to pass
stricter anti-drug measures.' 6 However, opponents believe that the policy will not
be effective as a deterrent17 and that persons charged with minor drug offenses
will go to court to protect their licenses, straining judicial and financial
resources.1 8 In addition, some detractors feel that the penalty of reduced driving
13. 23 U.S.C.A. § 159(aX1),(2) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (requiring a 5% annual reduction in federal
highway funds for non-compliance beginning in fiscal year 1994, and a 10% annual reduction for non-
compliance beginning in fiscal year 1996); ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrTI'EE ANALYSIS OFABX 79, at 2 (June
13, 1994) (estimating that the penalty for California's failure to comply is approximately $54 million annually
for the first two years, and $108 million annually thereafter).
14. See Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE
LJ. 2593 (1994), (reviewing STEvEN B. DUKE& ALBERTGRoSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: REHINKINO OUR
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993)) discussing various drug war efforts, such as the seizure of property,
civil fines, and license suspensions); Diana R. Gordon, The Drug War Hits the Roads, NArToN, May 31, 1993,
at 735 (analyzing the federal policy and slating that President Bush and the Director of National Drug Control
Policy, William Bennett, were trying to encourage state enactment of license suspension laws as part of the
effort to come down hard on casual use); Press Conference with William Bennett, Federal News Service, Nov.
15, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (discussing state and local policies as being crucial
fronts in the war on drugs). But see Dumb Drug Laws, SACRAmENTo BEE, Apr. 19, 1994, at B8 (calling the
license suspension proposal one of the "dumber" Bush-era war-on-drugs laws).
15. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrr, CoMmrrr ANALYSIS OF ABX 79, at 5 (June 28, 1994)
(quoting a DMV report entitled "The Relationship Between Drug Arrests and Driving Risk" issued January,
1994, which states that there is a nexus between drugs and traffic safety); Gordon, supra note 14, at 736
(quoting the co-author of the federal legislation, Representative Gerald Solomon, as stating that he wanted to
send a meaningful message to America's youth); Laura R. Hamburg, States to Yank Offenders' Drivers'
Licenses, STATES NEws SERVICE, July 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curws File (stating that
the program is popular with law enforcement personnel and quoting an officer as saying that the program will
allow law enforcement to get drug offenders off the road and that teen-age drivers will be deterred by the threat
of losing their license); Ryles Ready to Suspend Drivers' Licensefor Drug Convictions, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG
ABUSE WEEI, Sept. 2, 1992, at 5 (noting that according to the Federal Highway Administration, the rule was
implemented primarily to deter young people from experimenting with drugs).
16. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 736 (stating that one of the federal bill's co-authors' intent was to
get California and New York, states which had basically decriminalized possession of small amounts of
marijuana, to toughen their laws); Ray Tessler, Drug Chief Urges California to Reverse its Easy Pot Laws, S.F.
CHRoN., July 20, 1989, at A4 (quoting William Bennett as slating that America cannot tell other countries to
get rid of their drugs until we rid ourselves of drugs); Press Conference with William Bennett, supra note 14
(stating that California and New York have major drug consumption and trafficking problems and that their
laws should be sending a stronger message).
17. See Barnett, supra note 14 (arguing that drug war prohibitions have been ineffective as deterrents
and have been, in fact, counter-productive); see also 1994 Ky. Acts 52 (stating that Kentucky has criminal drug
laws on the books and that anyone not deterred from engaging in criminal conduct by those laws would
certainly not be deterred by the threat of the loss of their driver's license); Gordon, supra note 14, at 736
(stating that only the most timorous of recreational users would be deterred and quoting North Dakota
Governor George Sinner as commenting that heavy users and dealers already are so far outside the law that
the lack of a valid driver's license will not stop them).
18. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrTEE, CoMMrrr E ANALYSIS OF ABX 79, at 7 (June 28, 1994)
(stating that according to the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, marijuana
decriminalization has led to reduced costs in law enforcement and that these savings will be lost as minor drug
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privileges should only be imposed for driving violations,'9 and that this penalty
will work a great hardship on many otherwise law-abiding citizens20
Johnnie B. Beer
offenders go to court to protect their licenses); Dumb Drug Laws, supra note 14 (stating that people charged
with marijuana possession are far more likely to go to trial than they were when possession was a misdemeanor
carrying a mere fine of $100).
19. See ASSEmmLY COMMI'TE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITFEE ANALYsIs oF ABX 79, at 3 (Apr.
11, 1994) (arguing that license suspension is an appropriate punishment only for those offenses involving the
operation of a motor vehicle); see also People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322, 323 (I1. 1987) (holding that
revocation of a driver's license for an offense not related to driving is an arbitrary exercise of power by the
Legislature and is unconstitutional); Hamburg, supra note 15 (stating the opinion of the American Civil
Liberties Union that the statute is unconstitutional because there is no relationship between the crime and the
punishment). But see People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (1991),
Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641,642 (Ga. 1993), Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d
340, 344 (Mass. 1992) (holding that statutes requiring the suspension of a convicted drug or alcohol offender's
license bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and are therefore constitutional). See generally
Jeffrey T. Walter, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute or Regulation Authorizing Revocation or
Suspension of Driver's License for Reason Unrelated to Use of or Ability to Operate, Motor Vehicle, 18
A.L.R. 5TH 542 (1994) (discussing court decisions regarding statutes requiring suspension of driver's license
for a drug conviction).
20. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 737 (providing estimates of the number of citizens facing hardship
and detailing specific examples); Hamburg, supra note 15 (stating the position of the ACLU that the loss of
a license may lead to loss of ajob, then further criminal activity); Dumb Drug Laws, supra note 14 (arguing
that the loss of a driver's license may prevent people from getting drug treatment, may make it difficult to get
to a job or school, or may cause people to drive without a license or insurance).
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